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A B S T R A C T
This paper focuses on how scientiﬁc uncertainties about future peak ﬂood ﬂows and sea level rises are
accountedfor in long term strategicplanning processestoadapt inlandandcoastal ﬂoodriskmanagement in
England to climate change. Combining key informant interviews (n = 18) with documentary analysis, it
explores the institutional tensions between adaptive management approaches emphasising openness to
uncertainty and to alternative policy options on the one hand and risk-based ones that close them down by
transforming uncertainties into calculable risks whose management can be rationalized through
cost-beneﬁt analysis and nationally consistent, risk-based priority setting on the other hand. These
alternative approaches to managing uncertainty about the ﬁrst-order risks to society from future ﬂooding
are shaped by institutional concerns with managing the second-order, ‘institutional’ risks of criticism and
blame arising from accountability for discharging those ﬁrst-order risk management responsibilities. In
the case of river ﬂooding the poorly understood impacts of future climate change were represented with a
simplistic adjustment to peak ﬂow estimates, which proved robust in overcoming institutional resistance
to making precautionary allowances for climate change in risk-based ﬂood management, at least in part
because its scientiﬁc limitations were acknowledged only partially. By contrast in the case of coastal ﬂood
risk management, greater scientiﬁc conﬁdence led to successively more elaborate guidance on how to
represent the science, which in turn led to inconsistency in implementation and increased the institutional
risks involved in taking the uncertain effects of future sea level rise into account in adaptation planning and
ﬂood risk management. Comparative analysis of these two cases then informs some wider reﬂections
about the tensions between adaptive and risk-based approaches, the role of institutional risk in climate
change adaptation, and the importance of such institutional dynamics in shaping the framing
uncertainties and policy responses to scientiﬁc knowledge about them.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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While the scientiﬁc challenges of assessing the impacts of
future climate change are enormous, the institutional challenges
involved in using that science for policymaking are arguably even
greater. A growing body of work has highlighted the difﬁculties of
reconciling the supply of climate science with the demand for
research that is useful, useable, and used by policymakers
(Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007; Dilling and Lemos, 2011; Kiem and
Austin, 2013). Others have pointed to processes of co-production* Corresponding author. Fax: +49 341 235 45 1751.
E-mail addresses: christian.kuhlicke@ufz.de (C. Kuklicke),
david.demeritt@kcl.ac.uk (D. Demeritt).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.01.007
0959-3780/ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articand institutional boundary-work involved in the construction of
science and its use in policymaking and political debate (Shackley
and Wynne, 1996; Demeritt, 2001; Lemos and Morehouse, 2005;
Lövbrand, 2011). For instance, science agencies often assume that
adaptation policymaking requires more accurate and detailed
predictions about future climate changes. To this end, the UK
Research Council’s Living with Environmental Change Strategy has
promised to “strengthen the evidence base for policy, by
addressing the uncertainties about the impacts of environmental
change” (LWEC Partnership, 2011: 3). But that assumption and the
associated linear model of upstream science feeding into policy
decision-making downstream are both contested (Demeritt, 2006;
Dilling and Lemos, 2011; Kirchhoff et al., 2013).
Alongside an increasingly vocal debate among climate scien-
tists about the priority and policy relevance of reducing scientiﬁcle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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science literature has sought to explain how climate policymaking
should proceed in the face of uncertainty. While some advocate
risk-based approaches to optimizing climate policymaking (Yohe
and Leichenko, 2010; Cox, 2012; Ekström et al., 2013; Borgomeo
et al., 2014), others endorse ﬂexible, adaptive management
strategies for dealing with uncertainty (Holling, 1978; Pahl-Wostl,
2006; Allen et al., 2011) or urge the need for decision-making that
is robust to errors in current understanding (Dessai and Hulme,
2007; Lempert and Groves, 2010; Wilby and Dessai, 2010).
Although these approaches share some common roots in the
traditions of academic decision analysis, we show in this paper
how the institutional logics driving the adoption of risk-based
climate adaptation are in strong tension with the principles of
adaptive management. More speciﬁcally, risk-based approaches
aim at closing down the vast space of future possibilities by
attributing probabilities and consequences to them in order to
optimize decision-making and deﬂect criticism by rationalizing
how far it is reasonable to go in seeking to prevent potential
adverse outcomes (Power, 2004; Amoore, 2013; Oels, 2013).
Adaptive management approaches, by contrast, seek to keep the
management process open to the uncertainties inherent in future
developments by highlighting the conditionality and contested-
ness of current knowledge about the future (Holling, 1978). While
the conceptual distinctions between closing down and opening up
are widely acknowledged in academic science studies (Irwin,
2006; Stirling, 2007), if perhaps not always in the normative
literature on climate policymaking – compare Hallegatte (2009)
and Stern (2006) with Bellamy et al. (2013) – the tensions between
them and their practical implications for adaptation and the
institutional dynamics of policymaking and implementation are
less well understood.
To explore these issues we compare how uncertainties ﬁgured
in the execution of three related long-term strategic planning
processes designed to ensure Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk
Management (FCERM) in England is adapted to climate change.
With devolution, responsibility for FCERM in other parts of the
United Kingdom is now overseen by the devolved administrations
in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Though differing in some
small details, their approaches to FCEREM are broadly similar to
those in England. England was chosen as the site for this
comparative case study analysis because the national adaptation
programme for England (Defra, 2013a) and associated policy
guidance for taking climate change into account in FCERM (MAFF,
1993, 2000; Defra, 2006a, 2009; EA, 2011a) require decision-
makers to follow an adaptive management approach to allow
ﬂexibility for responding to future changes that are uncertain or as
yet entirely unknown. On the other hand, however, the strategies
for FCERM in England are also notable for their full-throated
commitment to being ‘risk-based’ (Defra, 2004; Johnson and Priest,
2008; EA, 2011b). In keeping with the UK government’s
longstanding advocacy of risk-based approaches to ‘better regula-
tion’ (Dodds, 2006; Rothstein et al., 2013; Demeritt et al., 2015),
FCERM uses various risk-based technologies and policy instru-
ments, like risk mapping, risk-based protection standards, and
risk-based resource allocation, to calibrate policymaking and
ensure that FCERM interventions are proportionate to their
expected costs and beneﬁts (Krieger, 2013). In this way, ‘risk’ is
not simply an object to be managed, but a central principle for the
organization of FCERM itself. Rather than trying to eliminate all
potential harms, risk-based approaches aim for an optimal balance
between socially acceptable levels of risk and the costs of further
risk reduction.
These alternative policy commitments pull those responsible
for adapting FCERM in different directions. Adaptive management
ideas enjoin policymakers to acknowledge uncertainty and adoptprovisional measures that can be adjusted or even reversed with
learning from experience. This emphasis on openness and
ﬂexibility can be challenging. FCERM often involves multi-million
pound decisions about whether to invest in protection schemes
whose up-front costs will only be repaid, if ever, by beneﬁts
realized many years into the future. While deferring investment or
planning FCERM in stages “through multiple interventions” (Defra,
2009: 23) can preserve the space to adapt to new information, it
also introduces delays and opens avenues for criticism and
inconsistency that can increase costs and complicate implemen-
tation. As well as being adaptive, FCERM must also be risk-based so
as to ensure its proportionality and cost-effectiveness (Defra,
2004; EA, 2011b). This requires policymakers to close down
uncertainties and transform them into calculable risks (Lane et al.,
2011a) whose management can then be rationalized through cost-
beneﬁt analysis and nationally consistent, risk-based priority
setting. Whatever approach they take to managing uncertainty, the
organisations responsible for FCERM also face second-order
institutional risks of criticism and blame for their conduct and
decision-making in managing the ﬁrst-order risks to society for
which they are accountable (Rothstein et al., 2006). As we will
detail below, concern for managing these second-order institu-
tional risks not only shapes how the ﬁrst-order risks to society
from future ﬂooding are understood and managed but also feeds
back to inform how uncertainties are framed and science used to
inform revisions to the management framework itself.
The paper is organized as follows. After describing our data
and methods, we deﬁne our conceptual approach to under-
standing risk and uncertainty and explore their implications for
adaptation decision-making and the emergence of institutional
risk. An institutional overview of adaptation and FCERM in
England then sets up two empirical case studies of how climate
change uncertainties about peak ﬂood ﬂows and sea level rise
are accounted for in different FCERM processes. In the ﬁrst the
poorly understood impacts of future climate change were
represented with a simple precautionary adjustment to peak
ﬂow estimates. Although crude, this one-size-ﬁts-all adjustment
provided a basis for formulating FCERM plans that was robust
to institutional challenges, at least in part because its scientiﬁc
limitations were only partly acknowledged by all of the various
parties involved. By contrast in the second case, greater
scientiﬁc conﬁdence led to successively more elaborate
guidance on how to represent the science. This, however, then
led to inconsistencies in how future sea level rise was taken
into account in different FCERM planning processes and thus
increased controversy and institutional risk for the operational
ofﬁcials involved. Comparative analysis of these two cases then
informs some conclusions about the tensions between adaptive
and risk-based approaches, the role of institutional risk in
adaptation, and the importance of institutional dynamics in
shaping the framing climate uncertainties and policy responses
to scientiﬁc knowledge.
2. Case study design and methodology
Our case study used a mixed methods approach combining
policy document analysis with key informant interviews con-
ducted in the summer of 2011. Whereas policy documents disclose
the formal basis by which climate change considerations are
incorporated into FCERM, interviews illuminate the informal
processes and ‘backstage’ understandings shaping the design
and implementation of those policies and of the science
underwriting them. To exploit these complementarities and the
potential for source triangulation to enhance the validity of
analysis, research proceeded iteratively, with data collection
interspersed with periods of analysis.
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involved in FCERM research and in policymaking at both the
operational and strategic level. We conducted interviews with
6 research scientists involved in providing scientiﬁc assessments of
climate change and its implications for ﬂooding to inform FCERM
policymaking in the UK. Additionally we conducted 12 interviews
with ofﬁcials involved in FCERM policymaking from the Depart-
ment for Communities and Local Government and the Environ-
ment Agency (EA) as well as local authorities from four different
areas selected from across the EA’s Southwest and Thames Valley
regions to represent urban, rural, and coastal areas exposed to
ﬂood risk. In devising our sample we looked to interview ofﬁcials
working in job roles at both the strategic level, setting the broad
framework for FCERM, and at the operational level, putting those
policies into everyday practice. While the distinction between
strategic and operational policymaking roles was sometimes
blurry, the degree of direct public engagement provided one
deﬁning measure. Whereas operational staff had regular contact
with the public and as such had to defend assessment results and
decisions against potential critics, strategic policymaking roles
were much less public facing. On this basis we classiﬁed
3 policymaking informants as ‘strategic’ and the other 9 as
‘operational’. Individual biographies afforded a few of our
informants with experience of more than one job role in FCERM
research and policymaking, but for the purposes of both
recruitment and analysis we classiﬁed our informants according
to their current job roles.
Interviews were semi-structured and followed a “problem-
centred interview” approach that explicitly considers the “inter-
play of inductive and deductive thinking” (Witzel, 2000: 1). The
interview protocol comprised broadly-framed and open-ended
questions inspired by our theoretical concerns with institutional
risk and the tensions between adaptive and risk-based approachesFig. 1. Alternative precautionary and managed adaptive approas well as exploratory ones to elicit information about actors’
particular roles and responsibilities, their professional routines
and practices, views on the uncertainties in FCERM and in climate
change projections, and the challenges that may arise from them.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and iteratively coded.
An initial set of deductively derived analytical codes was
elaborated further with codes derived inductively through an
initial reading of the interview transcripts and policy documents to
generate a list of codes that were then applied systematically to the
dataset using the qualitative data analysis software package
MaxQDA.
3. Adaptive and risk-based approaches to climate change and
adaptation
Within the ﬁeld of risk governance a variety of suggestions
have been put forward for improving decision-making about
climate change and other problems characterised by ‘deep’
uncertainties. Risk-based approaches to climate change seek to
identify optimal policy solutions based on ex ante assessment to
distinguish reasonably acceptable from unacceptable outcomes,
given the various costs and beneﬁts involved in reducing their
probability and consequences (Yohe and Leichenko, 2010; Webb,
2011; Oels, 2013). Uncertainties are acknowledged in this
approach and managed through Monte Carlo simulation, ensem-
ble prediction, and other forms of probabilistic risk assessment to
quantify them within conﬁdence intervals (Mastrandrea and
Schneider, 2004; Stephens et al., 2012; Ekström et al., 2013;
Borgomeo et al., 2014). By contrast, adaptive management
approaches endorse ﬂexibility and experimentation to enable
policymakers to change course in response to new information
(Holling, 1978; Pahl-Wostl, 2006; Allen et al., 2011) and avoid
decisions that lock-in long term policy commitments that wouldaches to risk-based management. After Defra (2009: 23).
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Dessai, 2010; Hall et al., 2012). Embracing the wider participatory
turn in science-based policymaking (Irwin, 2006; Stirling, 2007;
Demeritt, 2015), adaptive management approaches increasingly
also emphasise the importance of pluralism and participation to
opening up deliberation about the goals, standards of evidence,
and other matters of concern that need to be taken into account as
part of any adaptive approach to addressing the complexities of
climate change (Leach et al., 2010; Armitage et al., 2011; Lane
et al., 2011b; Klinke and Renn, 2012).
The origins of risk-based and adaptive management approaches
to climate change lie in the same broad family of anticipatory
decision-analysis. As such they are often said to be broadly
compatible (Lempert and Collins, 2007; Hallegatte, 2009). Indeed
Defra (2009: 23) treats them as complimentary approaches to
keeping risk of harm within tolerable limits (Fig. 1). They both
emphasise ex ante assessment to inform rational choices about an
uncertain future. Where they differ is in the weight they give to the
goals of optimization, adaptability, and precautionary avoidance of
a so-called ‘type II error’ (i.e. failing to detect an negative effect
although it is actually present) in their formalized approach to
decision-making in the face of uncertain future perils. While more
deliberative approaches to managing uncertainty share Haber-
mas’s scepticism of instrumental reason (Brown, 2009), they share
with that decision-analysis tradition a commitment to evidence-
based judgment in which arguments are always provisional insofar
as they remain open to better reasons and new information about
matters of common concern (Stirling, 2007; Klinke and Renn,
2012).
In contrast to this normative concern with how policymaking
ought to be done, a more explanatory strand of social science has
sought to understand how policymakers manage uncertainty in
actual practice. A growing body of work has highlighted the
defensive functions of risk-based approaches in deﬂecting blame
and rationalizing policy choices (Power, 2004, 2007; Rothstein,
2006; Rothstein et al., 2006, 2011; Porter and Demeritt, 2012;
Demeritt et al., 2015). Rather than championing risk analysis as the
only rational approach for coping with uncertainty (Hallegatte,
2009) or as a harbinger of some more reﬂexive modernization
(Beck, 1992), this more critical perspective sees risk-based
approaches to regulation and governance emerging in response
to external audit and accountability pressures (Power, 2004;
Rothstein, 2006). With the shift from government to governance
(Rhodes, 1996), organisations increasingly operate in a more
transparent and horizontal environment in which they must be
open and responsive to others (Walker et al., 2014). At the same
time, fashions in corporate governance and new public manage-
ment are turning organizations ‘inside out’ through audit regimes
that require them to account for the limits of their own
performance and to reframe potential obstacles to organizational
goals as ‘risks’ to be managed (Power, 2004, 2007). In turn, this
fantasy of control through the ‘risk management of everything’
then creates a new category of secondary, institutional risks of
being criticised or blamed that organisations charged with ﬁrst
order risk management responsibilities must also manage as well
(Rothstein et al., 2006). Strategies for limiting those second-order
institutional risks of blame, such as protocolization of operational
routines (Porter, 1995) and ‘strategic ignorance’ (McGoey, 2012),
can impede management of the ﬁrst-order risks to society by
closing down discussion, discouraging reﬂexivity, and promoting
blame avoidance. Thus risk registers and other risk-based policy
instruments designed to encourage organizations to anticipate and
engage with the uncertain potential for adverse outcomes may in
fact serve to reinforce institutional prejudices about them and to
deﬂect blame for failure by reframing the occurrence of adverse
outcomes as acceptable or completely unimaginable risks thatinstitutions could not reasonably be expected to have prevented
(Demeritt and Nobert, 2011; Rothstein and Downer, 2012; Huber
and Rothstein, 2013).
This more critical reading points to potential tensions between
the ideals of openness, reﬂexivity, and rationality in the face of
uncertainty championed by proponents of anticipatory analytic-
deliberative decision-making and the institutional logics of risk-
based governance, which emphasise blame avoidance by closing
down uncertainties and potential avenues of criticism and risk to
reputation. As we discuss in the next section, these alternative
approaches to understanding risk in governance not only suggest
some new ways to think about the well-recognized paradigm shift
in ﬂood management from engineering ﬂood defences to more-
risk based, adaptive management approaches (Johnson and Priest,
2008; Butler and Pidgeon, 2011; Porter and Demeritt, 2012), they
also highlight the importance of organisational dynamics and
institutional risk in shaping how agencies respond to the
uncertainties about climate change and future ﬂooding.
4. Adapting ﬂood and coastal erosion risk management in
England to climate change
Defra is the lead government department responsible for
FCERM and climate adaptation. Apart from statutory duties to
consult on the formulation of policy strategies and to report on
progress, the state enjoys broadly ‘permissive’ powers to act in
these domains, rather than strict legal duties of protection to
uphold. In keeping with broader shifts in the role of government in
Britain from ‘rowing’ and direct service provision to ‘steering’ and
regulatory governance beyond the state (Osborne and Gaebler,
1992; Moran, 2003), Defra relies on partnerships with a variety of
other public and private sector actors to deliver its strategic goals
for FCERM and climate adaptation within the limits of available
resources.
In this context of discretionary state responsibilities and limited
resources, risk plays an increasingly central role in both domains in
helping to deﬁne limited, rather than absolute, policy goals and in
prioritizing their implementation. Rejecting the traditional engi-
neering goal of “prevent[ing] ﬂooding and coastal erosion altogeth-
er” as “not technically, economically, or environmentally feasible”
(EA, 2011b: 16–17), the current FCERM strategy for England, like the
‘Making Space for Water’ strategy it succeeded (Defra, 2004), uses a
“risk-based management approach [to] target resources . . . where
they have greatest effect” and to “keep the costs of risk management
actions proportionate” (EA, 2011b:
16–17). To that end, Government policy has long required cost-
beneﬁt analysis of publicly funded FCERM schemes to “ensure that
public investment in risk management activities is justiﬁed and that
alternative options are properly considered” (Defra, 2009: 10).
Queries about the necessity of doing so are met with references to
HM Treasury’s (2003: v) Green Book and its “binding guidance for
departments and executive agencies” on cost-beneﬁt analysis
methods. Further technical guidance on such contentious issues
as intangible environmental impacts and the valuation of human life
(EA, 2010a) serves to pre-empt long-standing controversies over the
very application of cost-beneﬁt analysis to environmental manage-
ment (Davies and Demeritt, 2000). These strategic-level policy-
making requirements are designed to ensure that operational-level
decisions “are oriented to gaining the maximum economic beneﬁt
for the country as a whole” (Defra, 2009: 12). In so doing appraisal
guidance sets out the framework for generating the “information
that allows management decisions to be made” at all (Lane et al.,
2011a: 1792), since a risk-based approach is impossible without risk
estimates to drive operational-level implementation.
Under the 2010 Flood and Water Management Act the
Environment Agency plays both a strategic role in coordinating
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operational one in managing ﬂood risks from main rivers and
the sea and advising on local authorities on planning decisions
where ﬂooding is an issue. Local authorities are charged, as lead
local ﬂood authorities, with operational responsibility for manag-
ing local ﬂood risks from small rivers and streams (so-called
‘ordinary water courses’), surface water run-off, and groundwater,
in addition to their longstanding duties to consider ﬂood risk as
part of their spatial planning and land use regulation responsibili-
ties.
In discharging those various duties, FCERM agencies are
expected to follow a structured appraisal process to ensure that
policymaking is risk-based and proportionate. FCERM appraisal
guidance follows the Treasury (2003) Green Book in deﬁning risk
in the classical sense as a product of the estimated probabilities
and impacts of ﬂooding and coastal erosion (MAFF, 1993, 1999;
Defra, 2009; EA, 2010b). At the same time, it also acknowledges the
inherent uncertainties involved in predicting highly variable
physical and societal processes and encourages an adaptive
management approach to enable the “appraisal options to respond
to future change, during the whole life of a measure, as well as the
uncertainties” (Defra, 2009: 23). Flood risk appraisal guidance now
also requires “effective public participation and consultation”
throughout the entire process (Defra, 2009: 36), reﬂecting the
widespread hope that opening up risk assessment and appraisal to
external participation will improve their quality as well as their
public acceptability and organisational accountability (Irwin,
2006; Demeritt, 2015).
The strategy for climate adaptation also uses risk to inform
goal-setting and prioritization as part of a wider cross-government
commitment to a “risk-based approach to climate change” (Defra,
2012: 3). Under the Climate Change Act 2008, Defra is required to
prepare a UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) every ﬁve
years, “to give government and other organisations evidence to
help them take informed, cost-effective and timely decisions to
prepare for the changing climate”(Defra, 2013b). Exercising its
permissive powers “to act mainly where the market is unlikely to
act”, the Government deﬁnes its role as an enabling one:
“to help others make good decisions on climate risks and
opportunities (for example from investments in cutting edge
science and decision support), and to promote risk-based
decision approaches (for example early action on decisions with
long-term consequences, and maintaining ﬂexibility by avoid-
ing technical lock-in)” (Defra, 2012: 7–8).
The CCRA highlighted ﬂooding as the single greatest climate
change threat to the UK (Defra, 2012). Climate change is likely to
alter the risks to society from ﬂooding and coastal erosion through
two distinct physical processes. First, changes in the hydrological
cycle may alter the frequency of inland ﬂooding and through
feedbacks on land use, snowpack, and soil moisture, its magnitude
as well. For these processes there is only limited scientiﬁc
conﬁdence in estimates of how climate change may alter the
frequency and magnitude of peak ﬂood ﬂows in England (Reynard
et al., 2005, 2009; Lane et al., 2011a; Wilby and Keenan, 2012).
Second, rises in sea level will probably increase the rate of coastal
erosion and the associated risks from coastal ﬂooding. Compared
to ﬂuvial ﬂooding, there is greater scientiﬁc conﬁdence about the
increases in sea level due to thermal expansion of the oceans
(Defra, 2006a). However the potentially much greater volumes of
future sea rise due to accelerated melting of the Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheets, like the effects of climate change on coastal
ﬂooding and erosion risk due to potential changes in the frequency,
magnitude, and location of extra-tropical storms, were considered
too uncertain to quantify reliably and so were simply ignored in
Defra (2006a, 2009) guidance. The latest EA (2010b: 25) appraisalguidance now includes scenarios that take these more dangerous
potential effects into account.
Those longer-term risks from climate change are incorporated
into FCERM through three parallel assessment and planning
processes, which are underpinned by regularly updated guidance
from central government about how climate change should be
taken into account (MAFF, 1993, 2000; Defra, 2006a, 2009; EA,
2010b). First, long-term strategic plans for managing inland ﬂood
risk on the major rivers in England and Wales are set out by the EA
in 77 so-called Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs).
CFMPs were ﬁrst required following major ﬂood events in 1998 and
2000 so as to provide a holistic overview of ﬂuvial ﬂood risks at the
catchment scale, rather than the fragmented administrative
geography through which those risks were being managed at
the time. The latest generation of CFMPs considers all sources of
inland ﬂooding (rivers, ground water, surface runoff and also tidal
ﬂooding from rivers and estuaries) (EA, 2013). CFMPs are used by
the EA to prioritize its own investment and maintenance decisions
as well as informing its interactions with other stakeholders, such
as lead local ﬂood authorities and local planning authorities,
though evidence suggests that in fact those EA-produced CFMPs
have only limited inﬂuence on the SFRAs undertaken by local
planning authorities to inform their own planning and develop-
ment control (Thurston et al., 2010; Porter and Demeritt, 2012).
Although they are ignored by local authority SFRAs, the CFMPs are
sensitively dependent upon them. As Lane et al. (2011a: 1797) note,
CFMP assessments of future ﬂood risk often assume that local
planning policy will prevent any increases in exposure and
therefore consider changes in ﬂood frequency and magnitude
due to climate change as the main uncertainties to worry about.
These SFRAs are the second major assessment process through
which the long-term risks from climate change are incorporated
into FCERM. They were ﬁrst required of English Local Authorities
by the 2006 revisions to the PPS25 guidance on ﬂood risk (DCLG,
2006). SFRAs are supposed to ensure that LAs and developers alike
take appropriate notice of current and future ﬂood risk when
planning for local development. They are based on more detailed
local modelling than the CFMPs, but are still strategic in the sense
that they provide an overview of ﬂood risks across the entire LA,
rather than the very detailed ﬂood risk assessment required for
individual project-level planning decisions (Porter and Demeritt,
2012).
Third, Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) set out a long-term
strategic framework for managing coastal ﬂooding and erosion,
just as the CFMPs do for inland ﬂooding. But in contrast to the
CFMPs and SFRAs, the SMPs are not strictly required by
Government regulation and are instead prepared voluntarily on
a partnership basis by the EA and cooperating agencies to improve
policy coordination and inform deliberation over whether and
where to hold the line against rising sea levels. The ﬁrst generation
of SMPs was produced in the mid-1990s. A total of 11 SMP1s, each
subdividing the coast into a number of physically coherent
sediment ‘cells’ within which the movement of sand and shingle
is largely self-contained, were completed in that ﬁrst round. In
keeping with its commitment to an adaptive management
approach, Defra regards the SMPs as ‘living documents’ and is
encouraging authorities to revise their SMPs to take account of the
latest research on climate change and extend their planning
horizon from the 50 years used in the SMP1s out to 100 years for
the second generation of SMP2s. To support those revisions, Defra
published, in 2006, two lengthy volumes of revised Shoreline
Management Plan Guidance detailing the aims and requirements
(vol. 1) and procedures (vol. 2) for a second generation of SMPs
(Defra, 2006b). In the same year, Defra also published a further
“supplementary note to Operating Authorities” setting out new
instructions for how climate change should be taken into account
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2006a).
These three parallel assessment and planning processes were
governed by the same overarching strategic-level guidance on how
climate change should be taken into account. They also involved
many of the same participants. As such, they might be expected to
have been closely coordinated and internally consistent in their
approaches to adapting FCERM to climate change. And yet, as we
discuss below, they framed the scientiﬁc uncertainties about peak
ﬂood ﬂows and sea level rise in strikingly different ways shaped by
concerns with managing the institutional risks of adapting FCERM
to climate change.
5. Climate change and peak ﬂood ﬂows
Traditionally, estimates of the peak river ﬂows that might be
expected over a given time period were derived statistically,
based on historically observed ﬂood frequencies in the watershed,
sometimes supplemented by regionalizing and other methods for
dealing with data sparsity set out in the EA-endorsed Flood
Estimation Handbook (Institute of Hydrology, 1999). However
with climate change altering the boundary conditions controlling
ﬂood frequency, such empirical methods are increasingly
acknowledged to be problematic (Milly et al., 2008; Lane et al.,
2011a). Climate change uncertainties were not acknowledged in
the Government’s ﬁrst FCERM appraisal guidance (MAFF, 1993).
Revamped guidance, published in 2000, suggested that it might
be “reasonable” to consider the sensitivity of appraisal outcomes
to increasing “the ﬂow estimates in the ﬂood frequency curve by
up to 20% due to climate change, along with other considerations
of uncertainty” (MAFF, 2000: 15), but operational-level ofﬁcials
were given discretion about whether and how to take climate
change into account when assessing ﬂuvial ﬂood risk. This
changed in 2006, when Defra (2006a: 9) issued revised guidance
requiring FCERM authorities to apply a uniform 20% increase to
their estimates of river discharges after 2025 as a “single
precautionary allowance” for climate change.
Though admittedly simplistic, this 20% adjustment had been
endorsed the previous year in a peer reviewed study commis-
sioned by Defra and EA from expert consultants (Reynard et al.,
2005). Using the latest climate model scenarios, Reynard et al.
(2005: 61) found a wide range of impacts on future ﬂood ﬂows,
but since most of them fell “below the 20% increase”, that ﬁgure
was recommended as “appropriate as a precautionary response to
the uncertainty of future climate change impacts on ﬂood ﬂows.”
In this sense applying the 20% adjustment was somewhat akin to
the freeboard adjustments often used by ﬂood engineers to
provide an added margin of safety to compensate for unknown
factors that might compromise a ﬂood defence scheme (Kirby and
Ash, 2000). Although it did not explicitly alter ﬂood frequency, as
Lane et al. (2011a: 1797) explain, “scaling the peak ﬂow for all
ﬂows in the historical record [has] the effect of making a ﬂow
with a [given] probability under current climate more frequent as
a result of future climate change.” This uniform adjustment did
not account for variability in response by catchment type, nor did
it allow for “regional variations in ﬂood allowances” (Defra,
2006a: 3). These limitations were acknowledged in a footnote as
the subject of ongoing research, which would subsequently
conclude that “a single national allowance for climate change
might not be appropriate” (Reynard et al., 2009). But despite
these and other “signiﬁcant uncertainties”, Defra (2006a: 3),
nevertheless ordered FCERM authorities to apply the adjustment
“until further updates are provided”. By taking this “pragmatic
approach” to uncertainty, Defra (2006a: 3) transformed the
unknown possibility of changes in the magnitude of future
ﬂooding due to climate change into a calculable number that“allows management decisions to be made” (Lane et al., 2011a:
1792).
While Lane et al. (2011a) detail the scientiﬁc appraisal
processes by which uncertainties about future ﬂood ﬂows are
accounted for in the cost-beneﬁt analyses that drive risk-based
decision-making at the operational-level, they pay much less
attention to whether and how those uncertainties are understood
by different actors working at different levels in FCERM. Awareness
of these uncertainties varied widely among interview informants.
When asked about uncertainties, scientists were usually quick to
note how difﬁcult it is to quantify the effects of climate change on
the coupled processes of rainfall and runoff. Some also acknowl-
edged how the full scope of uncertainty about future ﬂood risk was
closed off by the use of the 20% adjustment to peak ﬂows. As one
scientist who had been involved in preparing the latest
UKCIP09 climate scenarios went on to explain to us:
“it is a very difﬁcult thing to come up with a quantitative
number of how much heavy rain will change and peak ﬂows.
We don’t really go there. [ . . . ]. Even in terms of the rainfall,
there’s a lot of uncertainty. There are a lot of seasonal
differences as well as regional differences across the UK as
well.”
All of the scientists interviewed expressed awareness of recent
developments in regional climate modelling since the publication
of Defra’s 2006 guidance; many were also aware of the work, still
ongoing at the time of our ﬁeldwork, to revise the climate change
guidance so as to take account of the latest probabilistic
UKCP09 scenarios provided by the Met Ofﬁce Hadley Centre (EA,
2011a).
There was also some awareness of these uncertainties among
the 3 informants working in strategic policymaking roles. Pointing
to the regionally differentiated projections provided by the latest
UKCP09 projections, one high-level policymaker with long
experience of reforming spatial planning policy guidance on ﬂood
risk noted that the problems of applying the 20% increase
uniformly were clear enough to see, at least in retrospect:
“But having looked at that again in UKCIP09, it's apparent that
there’s a huge amount of variation in there. Some areas it’s 20%.
In others it’s 50%. It all depends on the local conditions.”
But s/he was also quick to defend the 20% ﬁgure, albeit on
instrumental as much as scientiﬁc grounds:
“It was the best ﬁgure we had in previous UKCIP2, but it’s very
shaky. It was basically better than nothing. We had that ﬁgure
because we found from experience that if local people don’t
have speciﬁc instructions, they won't do anything. So what we
did is we gave them some indicative ﬁgures.”
Having been involved in revising planning policy guidance on
ﬂood risk, this informant was acutely conscious of the need for
clear and unambiguous guidance to drive the policy process and
reduce the institutional risks of taking climate change into account.
Five years ago, “people weren’t doing anything about climate
change . . . because . . . everything was based on the Environ-
ment Agency ﬂood zones, which are just snapshots” that ignored
future climate change altogether (cf. Porter and Demeritt, 2012).
But with the revised Defra (2006a) guidance, this policymaker
noted approvingly that operational-level staff now “have to take
into account climate change” in spatial planning and development
control regulation.
In this context the attraction of the 20% allowance was not its
scientiﬁc status—its reasonableness as “the best ﬁgure we had” at
the time was largely taken for granted. Instead specifying “some
indicative ﬁgures” was appealing to strategic-level ofﬁcials
because it overcame the hesitancy of operational level policy-
makers to act on the longstanding recommendation that it would
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outcomes to increasing “the ﬂow estimates in the ﬂood frequency
curve by up to 20% due to climate change” (MAFF, 2000: 15). While
they acknowledged its ﬂaws in retrospect, strategic-level policy-
makers endorsed the use of a single precautionary allowance as the
only way to get “local people” at the operational level to take the
uncertain but nevertheless broadly calculable risks from climate
change into account in FCERM.
Interviewees working at the operational-level and involved in
preparing and using CFMPs and SFRAs reported no such
uncertainties, either about the treatment of peak ﬂows or the
science underpinning it. Only 2 out of the 9 operational-level
informants could say anything about where the 20% allowance had
come from or the uncertainties associated with its use, whether in
those longer term planning processes or in appraising the project-
level designs their plans would inform. Its scientiﬁc basis was of no
interest to them. This is partly because they typically outsourced
the underlying technical analyses to scientiﬁc consultants and so
did not appreciate the scientiﬁc uncertainties involved in applying
the 20% allowance (Lane et al., 2011a; Haughton et al., 2015). Even
if operational-level staff possessed the necessary expertise, their
institutional distance from those analyses, combined with the
imprimatur lent by Defra’s (2006) recommendation, lent enchant-
ment to the 20% adjustment (Latour, 1999; Collins and Evans,
2007). Having a number to follow, and, if challenged, a rationale for
justifying its use was much more important to operational-level
policymakers than any uncertainties embodied by the recom-
mended ﬁgure. Indeed, when pressed, one ofﬁcial, responsible for
preparing and implementing the CFMPs in one of the EA regional
ofﬁces, simply retorted: “Why should people question it? Why?
We have a policy and this is the way we're going to do it.” If doubts
about the number were expressed, they were typically down-
played, as this quote from a local authority informant underlines:
“Again we’re talking about a 100-year extent. That 20% extra
ﬂow doesn’t make a lot of difference in terms of extent. It may
make a little bit more on damages. But again if you’re already
ﬂooded, what would that extra mean?”
This attitude partly reﬂects the relative insensitivity of ﬂood
inundation estimates to the additional 20% peak ﬂow adjustment
(Parkes, 2015), as well as the very distant time horizon over which
it is being applied in these more strategic FCERM planning
exercises whose connections to resource allocation and to more
immediate and contentious decisions about project-level appraisal
of ﬂood protection schemes were not always clear to outsiders.
These factors tend to attenuate public interest in the results of the
underpinning climate change risk assessments and thus the
institutional risks of being challenged over them.
By contrast, operational-level staff expressed much greater
concern about uncertainties in how present-day exposure to ﬂood
risk is calculated and externally communicated in different FCERM
plans and assessments. Different types of ﬂooding and different
datasets and models for assessing them can result in wide variation
in the number and location of properties estimated to be at risk of
ﬂooding (Parkes, 2015). While there are good scientiﬁc reasons for
those variations, members of the public do not always understand
or accept them, and operational ofﬁcials were concerned about the
institutional risks of being criticised as result, both from the public
at large and, in particular, from their elected representatives.
Expressing a sentiment shared by many interviewees, one
informant explained, “It’s a mineﬁeld. It’s a very tricky one.” He
explained how much effort his team at the EA was devoting to pre-
empting possible criticisms of the numbers it published in its
CFMPs and other risk management plans:
“A colleague of mine, his task at the moment is looking at all
these numbers of properties and start to say which one as aregion will we quote when asked. We get a standard list of
questions which we expect the media to ask us. We’ll have an
answer which we can all say the same.”
Although they could offer a multitude of answers, because
different assessments had been conducted at different times using
different methods and data for different purposes, operational staff
in the EA region ofﬁce felt obliged to close down that uncertainty
and provide a single authoritative answer that they could quote
back consistently when asked.
Local authority ofﬁcials face similar pressures, and they too
devote considerable effort to trying close off potential lines of
external complaint. One local authority informant with a strong
background in hydrology explained how in preparing a SFRA, he
was already anticipating the external scrutiny it would have to
withstand:
“I wanted to be able to come up with an assessment that treated
everywhere the same, so that if a councillor says ‘why isn’t my
town listed as a ﬂood risk area?’, I can say we did this
assessment and it didn’t come up that high.”
Consistency of approach – treating everywhere the same – was
seen as crucial to pre-empting criticism and managing institution-
al risk. It was also central to Defra’s (2009: 3) wider optimizing goal
of allocating resources according to risk so as to “be sure maximum
beneﬁt is achieved with every £1 of taxpayers’ money.” As Ted
Porter (1994: 391) has noted, standardization is often “more
important to a public measurement system than is close
approximation to true values as deﬁned by elite research
laboratories”. Although there are often good scientiﬁc grounds
for making different assumptions in different places so as to reﬂect
differing and dynamic levels of knowledge about them, the
resulting inconsistencies can be problematic for risk-based
approaches. First, as Lane et al. (2011a) note they undermine
the consistency on which risk-beneﬁt comparisons and risk-based
prioritisation and resource allocation depend. Second, as we will
see in the case of adapting FCERM to sea level rise, they also
amplify the institutional risks about how to take climate change
into account.
6. Sea level rise and coastal ﬂood risk
In contrast to peak ﬂood ﬂows, the effects of climate change on
sea level rise have long been considered in FCERM, but efforts to
adopt an adaptive management approach to scientiﬁc uncertainty
led to inconsistencies in implementation that undermined
commitments to risk-based policymaking. The ﬁrst generation
of SMPs had used ﬁgures for regional rates of sea level rise set out
by the Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF, 1993) in
its ofﬁcial Flood and Coastal Defence Project Appraisal Guidance
Note (PAGN). The PAGN ﬁgures, in turn, were derived from
estimates published in the ﬁrst IPCC assessment report (Warrick
and Oerlemans, 1990). In 1999, MAFF revised and substantially
expanded its project appraisal guidance for coastal and ﬂood
defence, but left its recommended allowances for sea level rise
unchanged from those originally set out in the 1993 PAGN based on
IPPC projections from 1990. As MAFF explained in the third
technical volume of its appraisal guidance (sometimes referred to
as FCDPAG3), while sea level rise projections are “continually being
reﬁned” to take “more complex feedback effects . . . into
account”, they must be “treated with caution”, and “with the
degree of uncertainty involved, there is no current justiﬁcation” for
changing the previously published estimates (MAFF, 1999: 43–44).
By 2006, however, Defra’s (2006b: 26) SMP guidance could point to
the UKCP02 climate scenario work done under the UK Climate
Impacts Programme as well as the extensive research on future
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(OST, 2004) as the scientiﬁc basis for issuing more detailed and
spatially and temporally precise projections of sea level rise than
were used for the very ﬁrst SMP1s in the mid-1990s.
Such conﬁdence meant the approach taken to translating the
uncertain impacts of climate change on sea level into a calculable
risk was quite different to that followed for estimating future peak
ﬂows under climate change (Fig. 2). Whereas a uniform adjust-
ment was made to all peak ﬂows over time, Defra (2006a)
recommended using an exponential curve for sea level rises to
reﬂect the latest IPCC projections about how they will evolve
dynamically over time. Furthermore, sea level rise projections
were also regionally differentiated to reﬂect differences in sea level
due to local land subsidence and isostatic post-glacial rebound of
the earth’s crust. Whereas the north of England is expected to rise
on the order of 0.8 mm/year over the next century, the land surface
across the East of England, East Midlands, London and the South
East of England is projected to recede by 0.8 mm/year. But these
regionally differentiated assumptions about isostatic rebound are
not the main reason that different planning documents often made
wildly inconsistent assumptions about future sea level rise
affecting the same or adjoining stretches of coastline.
Rather inconsistencies were created by the institutional
geographies of FCERM itself. One of the main reasons for apparent
inconsistencies is that SMPs were not the only FCERM plans
making allowances for future sea level rises. Sea level riseFig. 2. Sea level rise allowances (mm) used for the second generation SMPs (blue, outer lin
assumed sea level rise for the years 2085 (SMPs) and 2100 (CFMPs) are represented by the
stretches of shoreline to which those assumptions were applied in various SMP and CFMP
different administrative geographies and observing different central guidance depending
Defra (2006a) guidance superseded FCDPAG3 (MAFF, 1999). Coastal segments for which t
CFMPs and SMPs were not yet complete or the sea level rise assumptions not publicly avai
between the 77CFMP areas are outlined in grey. (For interpretation of the references to cassumptions were also made by a number of CFMPs and SFRAs
to inform their assessments of ﬂood risk to tidal estuaries, and
these assumptions often differed from those made in SMPs for the
same stretch of coastline. Additionally, the SMPs, CFMPs, and
SFRAs were institutionally separate processes involving different
sets of actors and proceeding without any formal mechanisms for
coordinating the one with the other. Moreover, these FCERM
planning processes were also based on fundamentally different
administrative geographies. The 77CFMPs (whose boundaries are
outlined in Fig. 2) were organized according to a riverine
geography of catchments and ﬂuvial ﬂooding that was very
different to the sediment cells and more localized ‘policy units’ that
were the foundation for the 22 SMP2s. SFRAs, meanwhile, were
prepared by local authorities at the local authority scale. These
different institutional geographies resulted in different manage-
ment plans based on different sea level rise allowances generated
through different local assessment processes.
Finally, inconsistencies also arose from the diverse temporali-
ties involved in FCERM assessment and planning processes.
Following Defra’s commitment to an adaptive management
approach to climate change, the CFMPs and SMPs were supposed
to be ‘living documents’ that would evolve and change to keep up
with the latest science (Defra, 2006a, p.2; MAFF, 2001, p.21). But
the process of revising central guidance was not closely coupled to
the timetable for local revisions to the SMPs and CFMPs. Updating
these plans can take years, and with different authoritiese) and CFMPs (green, inner line) for England and Wales. The differing magnitudes of
 thickness and hue of the various line segments. Their length represents the different
 planning documents prepared as part of two separate revision processes, based on
 on how far revisions to local baseline planning assumptions had progressed when
here is no information about sea level allowances, either because the revisions to the
lable online at the time of writing, are represented with a dotted line. The boundaries
olour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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subject to regular updates to maintain its scientiﬁc currency and
the institutional credibility of the central Government depart-
ments responsible for it, different planning processes followed
different sets of central guidance about how to treat the
uncertainties about future sea level rise. As one informant
responsible for overseeing the modelling done by consultants in
support of the SMPs recalled:
“We were working on the standard guidance when there was
the UKCIP02 that came out. That had the lower levels of sea
level rise estimates. So some of the early catchment ﬂood
management plans started working on that. But then we got the
2006 DEFRA guidance for the operating authorities and that
used the later version of the climate change levels.”
The combined effect of these institutional processes was that
radically different assumptions about future sea level rise could be
applied to the same or adjoining stretches of coastline by different
planning processes. For example, the CFMPs for the Wye and Usk
and for the Welsh side of the Severn Estuary, prepared under the
direction of the Wales regional ofﬁce of the EA, assume 1000 mm
sea level rise by 2100, or twice as much as the more optimistic
500 mm rise assumed by the CFMP for the Parrett catchment on
the English side of the Severn (EA, 2012), prepared somewhat
earlier by ofﬁcers from the EA’s Southwest region ofﬁce and
informing FCERM plans for the Somerset Levels that would later
prove to be so politically explosive during the winter ﬂoods of
2013–2014 (Demeritt, 2014; Thorne, 2014).
These inconsistencies in planning assumptions were a subject
of considerable concern to those working at the operational-level.
One EA ofﬁcial explained that inconsistencies created “problems”
for him and his colleagues, particularly during the required public
consultation phases of FCERM planning. Public pressure at these
meetings could be intense, as another EA informant working as a
community liaison manager explained:
“Coastal erosion, storms, and all that kind of things. People are
fairly aware of it and they can become quite nasty about it.”
In this context credibility and trust were crucial resources, but
they were easily eroded if errors, inconsistencies, or uncertainties
were exposed. Another EA ofﬁcial recalled how the Agency
struggled to regain public conﬁdence after its SMP1 estimates of
coastal erosion rates along the east coast of England proved
inaccurate:
“On the east coast had that as a problem, in that the original
coastal report, the SMP 1 prior to that, predicted quite low rates
of erosion, yet the locals were seeing much higher rates at
times, which is gonna happen, because you get a major storm
that’s one of the difﬁculties, isn’t it? It changes rapidly
sometimes and it is not a continuous stepwise process. So
we have seen that. That has slightly eroded the credibility of the
engineers.”
Inconsistencies in sea level allowances left operational ofﬁcials
feeling similarly exposed. Areas that might have been economi-
cally viable to defend using one set of sea level allowances might
no longer be if different, higher estimates were applied. The
variability in sea level rise allowances was particularly problematic
because, compared to the peak ﬂood ﬂow adjustments, they had a
much greater impact on assessments of ﬂood risk. The number of
properties estimated to be at risk of ﬂooding was sensitive to
changes of even just a few centimetres in projected sea level rise, as
this operational-level ofﬁcial noted:
“So even if you add on 20% of extra ﬂood, it's not really
impacting on any more properties. The sea level rise, it suddenly
changes everything. The places that weren’t thought of at risk
becomes in the risk zone.”This technical sensitivity was magniﬁed by the political
sensitivities involved in debates about whether and where to
hold the line against rising sea-levels. It was difﬁcult enough for
operational-level ofﬁcials to close off these high stakes debates,
without having their controversial decisions about whether it was
worth defending particular areas against the sea undermined by
complaints that they were based on different sea level allowances
to those used for cost-beneﬁt analysis in neighbouring areas.
Even if operational-level ofﬁcials were inclined to publicly
acknowledge the scientiﬁc uncertainties of coastal ﬂood risk
modelling, their dependence on consultant scientists and their
proprietary coastal erosion models made it difﬁcult to do so:
“again each of the plans that the consultants would have done is
a slightly different approach for the coastal evolution. They’re
largely, and again they have quite proprietary methodologies .
. . . it’s not like the ﬂooding one where it’s working to sort of
FEH [Flood Estimation Handbook] and they’re doing some
prescribed upfront, publicly visible, it's much more proprietary.
So it’s almost a black box from where we get our erosion
estimates.”
Most operational-level ofﬁcials were less sophisticated in their
appreciation of these scientiﬁc uncertainties.
Their institutional position discouraged them from expressing
scepticism of prevailing sea level rise projections, for fear it might
undermine efforts to communicate the seriousness of the threat.
Several informants noted the difﬁculties of getting local publics to
understand and accept the medium- to long-term risks from sea
level rise:
“So it’s a lack of believability for some people in the higher
levels of predictions. You’ve got a real problem in actually
getting them to think about the response ahead. I had one little
community which when you look at the road runs right along
the back of the beach. Even the coastal engineer down there
says, ‘the highway, we can’t lose that, it’s got to stay there’ . . . .
But the model is saying well, you could be seeing it retreat going
20 m, not a huge distance, but that’s going to almost take up the
highway.”
Uncertainty makes it difﬁcult to dispel this ingrained optimism
bias. Thus the 20 Year Flood Action Plan for the Somerset Levels
calls for the resumption of widespread dredging (Somerset Rivers
Authority, 2014), but the sustainability of those plans over even the
medium-term is very sensitive to sea level rise. With dredging
acknowledged to increase the present risk of tidal ﬂooding to the
town of Bridgwater and the Parrett CFMP projecting an additional
10,000 properties there at risk of ﬂooding under just a 500 mm sea
level rise assumption (EA, 2012), it is not clear what the risk-
beneﬁt ratio for dredging would be under the 1000 mm rise
assumption used for the more recently completed SMP for the
opposing Welsh side of the Severn Estuary, but it is almost certain
to be less favourable. Politics matters, of course. Backed with a
special line of £20 million from a panicked Prime Minister facing
re-election and pledging that money would no object (Demeritt,
2014), these plans for Somerset were not subject to the normal
risk-based disciplines of FCERM in England. Operational-level
ofﬁcials elsewhere need to be able to rationalize their plans in
terms of deﬁnitive risk calculations and those decisions can be
complicated –both technically and institutionally – if uncertainties
are acknowledged.
7. Discussion
These contrasting cases highlight important institutional
tensions between the injunction to remain open to uncertainty
and allow room to change direction in response to new
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translating the uncertainties about future ﬂooding into actionable
risk estimates for rationalizing risk-based management. These
tensions resulted in climate change uncertainties about peak ﬂood
ﬂows and sea level rise being framed and managed in very different
ways in three otherwise similar and inter-dependent FCERM
processes for long term shoreline and catchment ﬂood manage-
ment planning and strategic ﬂood risk assessment for spatial
planning and development control regulation.
In assessing ﬂuvial ﬂood risks, those planning processes
accounted for climate change by applying a blanket 20% increase
to estimated peak ﬂows to produce a calculable number required
for risk-based decision-making. Although this adjustment was
scientiﬁcally crude and readily acknowledged as such by scientiﬁc
experts and strategic policymakers, this was rarely acknowledged
by operational staff. For them the 20% adjustment was easy to
understand, and so they were quick to apply it in the consistent
way set out for them in the strategic guidance. Even if they
possessed the scientiﬁc expertise to appreciate the complexities
of future peak ﬂow estimates, which most did not, there was
every incentive for operational-level staff to adopt a position of
‘strategic ignorance’ (McGoey, 2012), since acknowledging
uncertainty would open up another line of potential criticism
at the various public fora at which they had to defend decisions
about the management of future ﬂuvial ﬂooding. In this way
proscriptive, one-size-ﬁts-all guidance reduced the institutional
uncertainties about whether and how climate change would get
taken into account, even as it tended to close down the space for
reﬂexivity about the scientiﬁc uncertainties involved in its
application.
This tendency for those relying on climate projections for
operational policy implementation to ascribe greater certainty to
them than the scientists involved in doing the actual modelling has
been noted before (Shackley and Wynne, 1995; Demeritt, 2001;
Lahsen, 2005). However our focus on institutional risk provides a
richer explanation of the drivers of this ‘certainty trough’
(MacKenzie, 1993: 371–372) than differences in expertise (Collins
and Evans, 2007) or tacit, and therefore also often somewhat
underspeciﬁed, processes of ‘co-production’, binding policymakers
to scientiﬁc results they depend upon but may not necessarily
understand in full.
The dynamics in the case of sea level rise offer some
interesting contrasts. Here, the underlying scientiﬁc knowledge
was framed as comparatively solid, and policy guidance sought to
reﬂect this with more spatio-temporally differentiated and
detailed advice about how uncertainties about future sea level
rises should be translated into calculable risks to be anticipated
and managed. The sensitivity of ﬂood inundation estimates to
assumptions about sea level rise made the scientiﬁc credibility of
those allowances critical. In an effort to shore up their credibility
and to protect their own institutional reputation for sound,
science-based advice, strategic-level policy makers at the EA,
Defra, and its predecessor MAFF regularly reviewed and revised
their guidance about how to represent the uncertainties in the
science. However the timing of their revisions in appraisal
guidance was only loosely coupled to implementation. Opera-
tional-level ofﬁcials had their own timetables for preparing SFRAs
and revising their CFMPs and SMPs, which proceeded at different
speeds in different regions and made different allowances for sea
level rise depending on the guidance prevailing at the time each
plan was being completed. The resulting inconsistencies in
operating assumptions about sea level rise then created
institutional uncertainties about whether operational plans for
managed realignment of the coastline would face public
challenge, given both their contentiousness and the sensitivity
of their underlying assessments of risk and beneﬁt to even smallshifts in sea level rise allowances. Operational-level staff were
acutely conscious of these risks to their authority and sought to
manage those institutional risks by closing down the uncertain-
ties about the analysis underpinning their policy decisions. This
response, in turn, tended to subvert the stated purpose of the
CFMP, SFRA, and SMP processes as a means for encouraging
deliberation and reﬂexivity about the long term strategic
challenges of climate change.
Our cases highlight the institutional geographies shaping
risk governance and climate change policy. Adaptation decisions
depend on scientiﬁc assessments, and a wealth of recent
research has explored the ways in which these coupled but
institutionally distinct processes are co-produced and mutually
constitutive (Shackley and Wynne, 1996; Demeritt, 2001; Lane
et al., 2011a; Lövbrand, 2011; Webb, 2011). Whereas the SFRAs
were rhetorically positioned as an assessment and planning
process that merely informs but is institutionally distinct from
the resource allocation decisions necessary to deliver on its
plans, the CFMPs and SMPs did not distinguish scientiﬁc risk
assessment from political risk management quite so sharply.
Nevertheless their authority still depended on the rhetoric of
being science-based and was therefore vulnerable if the
credibility of the underlying science were to be challenged or
change. Those involved in FCERM were very conscious of these
second-order risks to their institutional authority, and their
efforts to guard against them exemplify a wider “defensive
dynamic” (Power et al., 2009: 309) in the organizational culture
of risk management in Britain.
Two distinct strategies for managing these institutional risks
can be identiﬁed from our cases. First, in the case of peak ﬂood
ﬂows, challenges to the 20% adjustment were managed through
deferral of responsibility and blame deﬂection. Operational-level
staff avoided personal responsibility for adding this arbitrary ﬁgure
by pointing to the guidance and to the wider institutional
requirements to follow it, while at the strategic-level those
responsible for formulating that guidance appealed to the ‘science’
and to the independent peer reviewed research they commis-
sioned to legitimate it. The second common strategy is what Hood
and Rothstein (2001: 41) refer to as “prebuttal”, by which
institutions seek to respond “to anticipated criticisms or demands
for information before they materialize”. Protecting against such
criticisms is one reason why strategic-level ofﬁcials have been so
keen to keep updating their appraisal guidance. In so doing
however, they were not mindful of the institutional risks created
for operational-level ofﬁcials by the resulting inconsistencies in
the climate change assumptions used to drive risk-based plans for
coastal ﬂooding. Central guidance for peak ﬂood ﬂows has now also
been updated, with the uniform 20% allowance recommended by
Defra (2006a) abandoned in favour of more locally differentiated
adjustments (EA, 2010b). However, the SFRAs and CFMPs prepared
under the old guidance still stand and will continue to shape
operational and strategic decision-making until they are eventu-
ally updated locally.
But unlike the case of sea level rise, amendments to peak ﬂow
allowances are unlikely to cause much public controversy. Peak
ﬂood ﬂows are catchment speciﬁc and the resulting ﬂuvial ﬂood
risk estimates are more difﬁcult to compare with one another. As
a result inconsistencies in the basis for decisions about inland
ﬂooding made under the old and revised guidance are less
apparent than for coastal ﬂooding where the de-coupling of the
timetables for revising the central guidance from the separate
processes for preparing SMPs and CFMPs exposed operational-
level ofﬁcials to potential criticism and increased the institu-
tional risks involved in taking the uncertain effects of future sea
level rise into account in adaptation planning and ﬂood risk
management.
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In this paper we have explored the tensions between risk-based
and adaptive management approaches to policymaking in the face
of uncertainty. While these approaches may share common
decision-analytical roots, they involve very different institutional
logics. With its emphasis on optimising resource allocation and
standardising administrative decision-making, risk-based
approaches ﬁt uneasily alongside the emphasis given in adaptive
management to provisionality, ﬂexibility, and openness to
uncertainty, which can expose policymakers to potential criticism
and amplify the institutional risks of operational decision-making.
Our cases also highlight how institutional concern with
defensibility and with managing the second-order institutional
risks to the reputations of those charged with FCERM responsibili-
ties can inﬂuence the ways in which the ﬁrst-order risks to society
from climate change are themselves understood and managed.
While there may be reasons to suspect that Britain is particularly
prone to this defensive dynamic (Porter et al., 2015; Power et al.,
2009; Rothstein et al., 2013), risk-based approaches to FCERM are
increasingly common internationally, and there is evidence
elsewhere that concerns with reputation and institutional risk
may be inﬂuencing how institutions discharge their ﬁrst-order risk
management responsibilities (Kuhlicke et al., 2015).
Finally, our paper shows that greater scientiﬁc certainty about
climate change does not necessarily lead to more certain or more
effective policy outcomes. Despite being regarded by experts as, at
best, a makeshift estimate, the 20% adjustment to peak ﬂood ﬂows
proved quite effective in getting operational-level plans for risk-
based management of ﬂuvial ﬂooding to take the incompletely
understood impacts of climate change into account. With sea level,
however, efforts at the strategic-level to follow an adaptive
management approach by iteratively updating the guidance to
keep it in line with the very latest scientiﬁc advances led to
inconsistencies in the implementation of that guidance that
exposed operational authorities to potential criticism and ampli-
ﬁed institutional anxieties about whether and how to adapt FCERM
to climate change. These institutional risks arose, not so much from
the limitations of scientiﬁc knowledge of climate change as from
the very institutional architecture for translating those uncertain-
ties into actionable policy.
Our research thus suggests reasons for caution about the heavy
emphasis sometimes given in climate change research and
policymaking to generating ever more elaborate and probabilistic
scenarios of future climate change to underpin policy decisions
(LWEC Partnership, 2011). While it is certainly important to clarify
and correctly communicate scientiﬁc uncertainties, this is not
sufﬁcient for effective policymaking, particularly if it fails to
acknowledge the conﬂicting interests and institutional demands of
the various actors involved in science-policy processes. Indeed
several recent studies have pointed to situations in which
probabilistic representations of scientiﬁc uncertainty, so prized
by the climate research community, are not simply unwanted by
those charged with policy decisions but actively resisted (Demeritt
and Nobert, 2011; Tang and Dessai, 2012).
Our ﬁndings show that institutional dynamics are as important
for the effectiveness of adaptation as the quality of the underlying
science and the sensitivity of those policy decisions to uncertain-
ties or error in their assumptions, as emphasised by advocates of
adaptive management and robust decision-making. Those institu-
tional dynamics and the ways in which they shape the framing and
response to scientiﬁc uncertainties and risk are typically ignored in
normative theories of decision analysis for policy making. If these
considerations about the practical use of science in governance
continue to be ignored, there is a risk not just of poorer adaptationpolicy, but also of poorer science too, insofar as climate policy
processes reciprocally inﬂuence the underlying science.
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